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ABSTRACT 
The present article proposes Heathcliff and Sarah Woodruff as monstrous beings 
who reclaim their desire to be agent subjects in a society and a narrative which 
deny such a possibility. It would be possible to argue, however, that their 
monstrosity might be that of the unique specimen, the potential first stage towards 
the improvement of species through natural selection as theorized by Charles 
Darwin in 1859. The multiple references to Darwin’s study in the novel by John 
Fowles demonstrate that such a theory could clarify what Sarah represents in the 
novel. In a retroactive manner, Darwinian theory might be used to understand 
what Heathcliff is, who Heathcliff is, and why he is the object of general 
animosity. It might be concluded that what is really monstrous about these two 
characters is that both are new specimens, avant la lèttre, and they occupy a space 
to which language has no access. 
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RESUMEN 
El presente artículo propone a Heathcliff y Sarah Woodruff como seres 
monstruosos que reclaman su deseo de ser sujetos agentes en una sociedad y una 
narrativa que niegan tal posibilidad. Sería posible argumentar que su 
monstruosidad sea la del espécimen único, el potencial primer estadio hacia la 
mejora de la especie a través de la selección natural tal y como la teorizó Charles 
Darwin en 1859. Las referencias al estudio de Darwin en la novela de John 
Fowles demuestran que esta teoría clarificaría lo que Sarah representa en la 
novela. De manera retroactiva, la teoría Darwiniana podría usarse para entender 
qué es Heathcliff, quién es Heathcliff, por qué es objeto de tanta animadversión. 
Podría concluirse que lo que es realmente monstruoso de estos dos seres es que 
ambos son especímenes nuevos, avant la lèttre, y ocupan un espacio al que no 
tiene acceso el lenguaje. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Heathcliff and Sarah Woodruff could be described as creatures who 
reclaim their desire; the desire to be agent subjects in a society and a narrative 
which deny their subjectivity. There is no contradiction here; both Heathcliff’s 
and Sarah’s situations may be possible if one takes into account the words of 
French philosopher Catherine Clément. In “The Guilty One,” Clément reminds us 
that “[s]omewhere every culture has an imaginary zone for what it excludes” 
 (36). This is true. Every culture constitutes a universe in itself. The same could be 
argued about any narrative, which rules itself through certain dynamics which are 
established as the narration follows its natural progress. Each and every of the 
characters, images, symbols, and scenes are minutely limited and controlled by 
narrative dynamics. Nevertheless, maybe ironically, every narrative –like every 
culture- contains an imaginary zone where the material which has been excluded 
can reside. Such material might be called abject, but also monstrous. It has been 
created by narrative itself. 
I will propose Heathcliff and Sarah as inhabitants of that imaginary zone 
of their narratives and, by extension, of their cultures. I will demonstrate that 
these two abject and monstrous beings constitute desire –Otherness- to each and 
every other character of the novels they inhabit. In other words, I will argue that 
Heathcliff and Sarah are inhabitants of the space of desire, the faultline which 
every text allows, the twilight zone which every text constructs. 
I will begin by examining the dynamics established by desire, theorizing 
upon the subject, language, and the concept of otherness. I will try to delimit the 
place (or, rather, the non-place) which desire occupies in culture/narrative. It is 
more than possible that this may be a failed attempt, since we (instinctively?) 
know aforehand that desire is limitless and, thus, it has no preestablished place 
within what we traditionally call ‘culture’. Thereafter, I will propose the character 
of Heathcliff as an object of (narrative) desire and, therefore, non-character. 
Finally, the character of Sarah (whom I will describe as a female Heathcliff) will 
be used to cast light upon the phenomenon which Heathcliff represents in the 
narrative dynamics established by Emily Brontë. That is to say, I will try to 
explain Heathcliff –and what he represents- through a theory in retrospective: the 
Darwinian theory of the origin of species. I will conclude that what is truly 
 monstrous about these two characters is that they are avant la lèttre, inhabiting a 
space to which language, and thus definitions, have no access. 
 
2. DESIRE, SUBJECTIVITY, LANGUAGE, OTHERNESS, VOIDS 
“Desire is what is not said, what cannot be said” (Belsey 1994: 76). 
 Desire is what is not said because it cannot be said. It is obvious that the 
word ‘desire’ can be articulated; we may even find a definition in any valuable 
dictionary. No definition, however, will prove completely satisfactory. Desire, its 
dynamics, its consequences, prove ellusive terms. Let us take as an example 
British theorist Catherine Belsey who, in 1994, writes a whole volume of desire 
which is entitled, precisely, Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture. Every time 
Belsey tries to define desire, she stumbles upon the same problem: she only 
makes matters more convoluted. Here is an instance: 
[Desire is] a kind of madness, an enchantment, exaltation, anguishes … 
perhaps the foundation of a  lifetime of happiness. […] The commonest 
and yet the most singular condition we know. At once shared with a 
whole culture, but intimate and personal, hopelessly banal and yet unique 
(Belsey 1994: 3). 
 
What is interesting about this definition is, precisely, that it fails to define its 
object. Belsey’s tentative language powerfully calls the attention of the reader: “a 
kind of”, “perhaps”, “at once ... but”, “hopelessly ... yet”. The elusiveness of 
these terms promotes a void of meaning which the reader must actively fill, the 
author has proved unable to fix the definition, to put it bluntly, Belsey has not 
been able to find what Flaubert used to call le mot just. It is also interesting to 
observe the amount of contradictions Belsey incurs into in her four-line 
definition: desire is “The commonest and yet the most singular condition we 
know. At once shared with a whole culture, but intimate and personal, hopelessly 
banal and yet unique” (Belsey 1994: 3). In short, readers do not really know 
 exactly what to think: is desire common or singular? Is it intimate and personal or 
is it shared with a whole culture? I would like to point out that my assessment of 
Belsey’s (non)definition here is far from negative. To the contrary, tentative 
language, voids of signification, even multiple contradictions, indicate that Belsey 
has offered an excellent proposal and her definition of desire is, ironically, most 
accurate, basically because it is not possible to offer a complete and satisfactory 
definition of what desire actually is. To try and give a name to what is inherently 
unnameable is an enterprise which we know is doomed to fail even before we 
embark upon it. 
Maybe, instead of trying to define desire, we should ask ourselves which 
is the place that desire occupies within what is known as culture. But this also 
proves unsafe terrain since the terms “desire” and “culture” are antithetical. If the 
definition of desire is elusive is precisely because it does not occupy a solid, fixed 
position within culture; therefore, it cannot be articulated, defined, locked within 
linguistic limits. Far from frustrating us, such an elusiveness promotes the 
compulsion to keep on writing about desire, in a banal attempt to fix it (and also 
because speaking about what cannot be defined may prove an interesting game). 
We may try hard to fix desire to a definition, but we will continue to fail 
irremediably. This is due to desire itself. But also due to language. 
Language, the realm of the subject. Let us recover Jacques Lacan’s words: 
we are born as organisms (that is, we belong in nature) and we transform into 
subjects as we interiorize culture. This interiorization of culture starts when we 
begin to learn language, obviously, since the transformation into subjects involves 
language use; the capacity to give meaning –to define- what is around us. But this 
comes with some baggage. Language becomes Other because it belongs to 
culture, not to nature (it is not organic, the way we are when we are born). 
 Language precedes us, it is there before we are born, it exists beyond the subject 
and, as such, it does not belong to it. But, on the other hand, it is the only 
mechanism which we have (to this day) in order to define, in order to 
communicate with others and with ourselves. In short, we are born in complete 
connection with the organic world, but we become separated from it through 
multiple castrations, all of which mimic the primordial castration from the 
maternal body upon which psychoanalytic theory is based. In this process, we are 
left with only one alternative: we have to formulate our needs through a tool 
which is alien, but it is the only tool we have at hand. 
We might speak, then, of a void that stands between us and the separation 
(as in any symbolic castration process). It might be a residue of our experience as 
organic beings, something beyond all definitions that language might propose. 
Lacan calls this “the real”. Obviously, the real is not reality (since reality is 
culture); on the contrary, the real is that which is organic and beyond all 
definitions, but also something that we cannot name because it simply does not 
exist with the proposal of significations that language offers. We may find it in 
any arena regulated by the unconscious: dreams, slips of language, multiplicity of 
meaning… Each and every of these are related to a certain dissatisfaction which 
we are not able to specify. It is a void between the organism and the subject of 
language. This void promotes the appearance of desire; the desire for something 
which is unnameable (since desire itself is also unnameable) and, as such, 
unconscious. From this moment on, we will try to fill in this void with a 
succession of objects of desire which might take the most extraordinary of forms. 
It is an attempt to feel whole again, to heal the wound which has opened between 
the subject and the lost real. Desire is, then, constant metonymy, that which 
searches obsessively for substitution, permutation, translation. It will never 
 become completely present. Desire is always absent and, in its absence, it is 
always present: 
Desire is that which is manifested in the interval that demand hollows 
within itself, in as much as the subject, in articulating the signifying chain, 
brings to light the want-to-be, together with the appeal to  receive the 
complement from the Other, the Other the locus of speech, is also the 
locus of want, or lack. 
That which is thus given to the Other to fill, and which is strictly that 
which it does not have, since it, too, lacks being, is what is called love, but 
it is also hate and ignorance (Lacan 1977: 263). 
 
Lacan explains it very well: desire manifests itself in an interval that demand 
hollows within itself. Such a demand promotes that the subject should articulate 
the signifying chain (it speaks, it asks for something), while it discovers its lack, 
its need to open to the Other (through that other Other which is language). This is 
the reason why the Other is the location of language: we, subjects of language, 
create the Other through the words we use. But the Other is also the location of 
lack which has brought us to use language and demands that the hole be filled. 
Now comes tragedy. We demand from the Other that it fill the gap, but the Other 
is unable to do so, since it too is empty. That is to say, we project our desire upon 
the Other and construct it, in the knowledge that the process will construct us too. 
 Would it be possible, then, to speak about the desire of the Other? Can we 
say that the Other has desire? No. The dynamics of desire has proved that when 
the Other desires, it is not the Other anymore, it achieves the position of the 
subject. Then, we become the Other. 
 
3. “L’ENFER C’EST LES AUTRES”: HEATHCLIFF 
’Why, about you!’ Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands 
triumphantly. ‘And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you 
suppose you’d be?’ ‘Where I am now, of course,’ said Alice. ‘Not you!’ 
Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. ‘You’d be nowhere. Why, you’re 
only a sort of thing in his dream!’ ‘If that there king was to wake,’ added 
 Tweedledum, ‘you’d go out –bang!- just like a candle!’ ‘I shouldn’t!’ 
Alice exclaimed indignantly (Carroll 1963: 238). 
 
The twins Tweedledee and Tweedledum try to make Alice understand that 
she is only an image –a character- within the dynamics of the dream that the king 
is immersed in. Within such dynamics, if the king woke up, Alice would go out 
(“bang!”), just like a candle. According to the twins, Alice is not “real”. What is 
interesting about this quote is the clarity of the twins’ views on the dynamics of 
dreams, unconscious, narrative (oniric, in this case) and its capacity to construct 
and deconstruct the characters which inhabit it, who have no autonomy beyond 
these dynamics. On the other hand, it is also shocking to see the violence with 
which Alice rejects to see herself as a projection which may effectively go out –
vanish- once the dream –the narrative- is over. Alice does not want to be a 
dreamed object, she wants to have an autonomous identity beyond what narrative 
parameters establish. In other words, Alice is positioning herself in that liminal 
space of the Other which desires (to become an agent subject), just like 
Heathcliff. 
This quote is useful to establish what happens to the character of 
Heathcliff within the narrative imagined –dreamed?- by Emily Brontë. Heathcliff 
is the object –the Other- who strives to become a subject, even when narrative 
dynamics transform his strive into a banal enterprise. From the very beginning of 
Brontë’s novel, Heathcliff is situate within the linguistic parameters of the 
foreigner, thus establishing solid links with Dracula, Satan, and all those alienated 
figures which appear to destabilise the presumed solidity of what we know, 
culture. In the words of Heiland, “[Heathcliff] does not so much tear things apart 
as show us how fragile they were to begin with” (Heiland 2004: 117). Although it 
is true that Heathcliff is presented as montrous and diabolical as Satan himself, 
 what really unites him to the figure of the foreigner is its tragic ingredient. What 
is Heathcliff’s tragedy? The tragedy of loneliness. When I refer to loneliness here 
I do not mean that he is on his own in a physical sense, but I am rather making a 
point about the metaphysical loneliness of the character who sees the world from 
a perspective that is completely unique: the loneliness of the monster, to put it 
another way. Heathcliff’s reasons for his metaphysical and monstrous loneliness 
are multiple: the mystery of his provenance, his presumed orphanhood, his 
absolute dispossession from Victorian culture, his social class, his ethnic origin… 
All of these elements converge in one: Heathcliff is a new specimen and, as such, 
he is unique in his species. That is the reason why he is so lonely. 
 And that is the reason why he is also beyond language, in a symbolic 
ambiguity which confers his most monstrous aspect. Who is Heathcliff? What is 
Heathcliff? Throughout the novel, many characters try to provide answers to 
these questions; they all fail irremediably, since Heathcliff –the object of desire- 
precedes the language with which he could be defined. Heathcliff stands beyond 
linguistic, narrative, and cultural dynamics. Enrique Gil Calvo, the author of  
Máscaras masculinas: héroes, patriarcas y monstruos, argues that: 
el monstruo puede ser una representación simbólica del Prójimo: del Otro 
y los otros, nuestros semejantes más ajenos, lejanos o socialmente 
distantes de nosotros. Si el Extraño parece un ser de otra especie (un 
monstruo) es porque se sitúa fuera de nuestro alcance ... [...] Esto explica 
el temor que infunde el forastero (Gil Calvo 2006: 84). 
 
Heathcliff inhabits, then, the space of desire. For this reason, he acquires 
the status of character (dreamed, projected) not only for the reader of Bontë, but 
also for the rest of the characters of the novel. Gil Calvo, again, argues that 
“podría pensarse que el monstruo no actúa por sí mismo como sujeto agente, sino 
que se limita a servir de objeto” (Gil Calvo 2006: 85), but nothing further from 
the truth. The monstrous Other has the capacity of destroying the subject or, even 
 worse, “como señaló Nietzsche, el que lucha con monstruos debe tener cuidado 
de no convertirse él mismo en monstruo” (Gil Calvo 2006: 85), since the monster 
is nothing but “una invención imaginaria del propio sujeto agente, causada por el 
temor a sí mismo” (Gil Calvo 2006: 86). As Sartre rightly said, “l’enfer c’est les 
autres” (Sartre 1944: XX). 
Let us recover the idea that Heathcliff is not a character just for the reader 
but also for the rest of the characters who inhabit Brontë’s text. The dynamics 
established from the very beginning of the novel feature a narrator (Lockwood) 
who positions himself as a subject who narrates (through his diary entries) his 
object (Heathcliff). This has immediate repercussions upon our own way to 
imagine the character. In his total ignorance of the main character, Lockwood 
decides to fill in the voids of information which Heathcliff’s taciturnity creates. 
Hence, he presents his object as a “dark-skinned gipsy in aspect, in dress and 
manners a gentleman”, “an erect and handsome figure; and rather morose” 
(Brontë 2005: 4). The beginning of the narrative, then, marks also the 
inauguration of Heathcliff as a dreamed object, the projection of whatever 
Lockwood wants to see. Later, Nelly Dean, the novel’s second main narrator, will 
end up reaffirming Lockwood’s projection: in response to her query as to what he 
thinks of Heathcliff, Lockwood replies that he deems him a “rough fellow”, to 
which Nelly hurriedly replies: “Rough as a saw-edge, and hard as a whinstone!”, 
and adds: “The less you meddle with him the better” (Brontë 2005: 37), assuring 
with her words that Heathcliff is positioned not just as the Other, but as the 
dangerous, monstrous Other.  
There is very little Heathcliff may do to escape such a narrativization of 
his persona. His identity is created both through Lockwood’s projections and 
Nelly’s story of his arrival to Wuthering Heights, when he is between six and 
 eight years of age and adopted by Mr. Earnshaw. Far from being able to tell the 
family about his provenance, Heathcliff is only able to repeat “some gibberish” 
which nobody can understand (Brontë 2005: 39), thus placing himself beyond 
language and what is intelligible. No doubt this is the reason why the Earnshaws 
decide to give him a name, thus cutting him off from his potential genealogy and 
reaffirming the mystery of his origins. Such a mystery is both unfathomable and 
ominous: “from the very beginning, he bred bad feeling in the house”, according 
to Nelly Dean’s story (Brontë 2005: 40). The enigma of Heathcliff’s origins is the 
source of his non-identity, the lack of a family history promotes the ambiguity of 
this character and his presumed alliances with what is obscure and unknown, 
particularly in the nineteenth century, when ancestry marked fate. Nelly believes 
that “it appeared as if the lad were possessed of something diabolical” (Brontë 
2005: 70), but she also falls prey to fantasy when she imagines a past for 
Heathcliff, one which could easily have been taken out of a fairy tale: 
You’re fit for a prince in disguise. Who knows, but your father was 
Emperor of China, and your mother an Indian queen, each of them able to 
buy up, with one week’s income, Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross 
Grange together? And you were kidnapped by wicked sailors and brought 
to England (Brontë 2005: 60-61). 
 
Inadvertently, Nelly is writing not just the past but also the future of Heathcliff. 
He will, indeed, transform into the owner of two houses becoming, in the process, 
the sort of capitalist monster which is particularly terrifying in the hierarchical 
nineteenth
 
 century: the bourgois who acceeds to power through money as 
opposed to lineage. The monstrous intruder is most dangerous when he 
dispossesses us from what we believe is ours by birth right. 
 After a while in an unknown place, Heathcliff comes back to prove that 
transformation is possible: 
 Now, fully revealed by the fire and candlelight, I was amazed, more than 
ever, to behold the transformation of Heathcliff. He had grown a tall, 
athletic, well-formed man; beside whom my master seemed quite slender 
and youth-like. His upright carriage suggested the idea of his having been 
in the army. His countenance was much older in expression and decision 
of feature than Mr. Linton's; it looked intelligent, and retained no marks of 
former degradation. A half-civilised ferocity lurked yet in the depressed 
brows and eyes full of black fire, but it was subdued; and his manner was 
even dignified: quite divested of roughness, though stern for grace (Brontë 
2005: 104). 
 
This transformation clearly positions Heathcliff within the symbolic economy of 
culture; in spite of this, the quote proves how Nelly is still intent on describing 
Heathcliff as a liminal being. His nature, she claims, is still visible through the 
eyes which prove his “half-civilised” ferocity. A new stage opens for Heathcliff, 
one in which, in spite of his financial and social progress, each and every 
character speaking of him will continue to make disturbing references to his 
presumed connections with the diabolical, the unexplainable, the obscure, the 
dangerous. In short, each and every character will continue to project upon 
Heathcliff his/her own fears and desires. This is Catherine describing Heathcliff 
to naïve Isabella who claims she has fallen in love with him: 
'I wouldn't be you for a kingdom, then!' Catherine declared, emphatically: 
and she seemed to speak sincerely. 'Nelly, help me to convince her of her 
madness. Tell her what Heathcliff is: an unreclaimed creature, without 
refinement, without cultivation; an arid wilderness of furze and 
whinstone. I'd as soon put that little canary into the park on a winter's day, 
as recommend you to bestow your heart on him! It is deplorable ignorance 
of his character, child, and nothing else, which makes that dream enter 
your head. Pray, don't imagine that he conceals depths of benevolence and 
affection beneath a stern exterior! He's not a rough diamond - a pearl-
containing oyster of a rustic: he's a fierce, pitiless, wolfish man. I never 
say to him, "Let this or that enemy alone, because it would be ungenerous 
or cruel to harm them;" I say, "Let them alone, because I should hate them 
to be wronged:" and he'd crush you like a sparrow's egg, Isabella, if he 
found you a troublesome charge. I know he couldn't love a Linton; and yet 
he'd be quite capable of marrying your fortune and expectations: avarice is 
growing with him a besetting sin. There's my picture: and I'm his friend - 
so much so, that had he thought seriously to catch you, I should, perhaps, 
have held my tongue, and let you fall into his trap' (Brontë 2005: 111). 
 
 There is no bourgeois in the above description; we only read about an 
ambiguous creature, a hybrid between the human and the animal which reveals 
itself as monstrous as ever. Isabella herself, later, will also define Heathcliff as “a 
lying fiend, a monster, and not a human being” (Brontë 2005: 164). Young Cathy 
–Catherine and Edgar’s daughter- assures Heathcliff that he is as lonely as the 
devil and nobody will cry for him after his death (Brontë 2005: 298). As the 
narrative progression advances, Heathcliff’s dark origins become increasingly 
ominous to the point that, near narrative closure, Nelly Dean still continues to 
wonder: “Is he a ghoul or a vampire? [...] where did he come from, the little dark 
thing?” (Brontë 2005: 341-342). Heathcliff is an unresolved mystery from 
beginning to end. It is only logical that, after his death, country folks assure that 
they can see his ghost walking on the moors. We still do not know who or what 
Heathcliff is, but we do have the feeling that he is the Other who desires. 
 
4. “THE HOPEFUL MONSTER”: SARAH WOODRUFF 
Although The French Lieutenant’s Woman was written in 1969, it is a text 
which takes us to the past, effecting a marvellous revision of the Victorian period 
through a 20
th
 century innovative narrator who offers comments and critical 
judgement throughout the narration. From a very simplistic point of view, this is 
the story of Charles Smithson, an aristocrat who finds himself in a difficult 
situation after meeting a mysterious woman, Sarah Woodruff. Such a meeting 
will compromise Charles’s engagement with Ernestina, a young woman who is 
very much a product of her age and, as such, completely opposed to the extremely 
advanced character that Sarah is. The story is permeated with references to 
Charles Darwin’s famous study On the Origin of Species, a text which Tony E. 
 Jackson considers paramount in order to try and give meaning to the character of 
Sarah. 
Who is Sarah? What is Sarah? These questions are familiar to us. Indeed, 
they are the same questions we posed when tackling the character of Heathcliff. 
Sarah and Heathcliff have a lot in common: both represent Otherness with the 
narrative dynamics established by the text, both inhabit the dark space that desire 
establishes beyond culture. The text itelf poses this question in an obsessive 
manner: “Who is Sarah? Out of what shadows does she come?” (Fowles 1969: 
95-96). Sarah can indeed be defined: she is an intelligent woman (Fowles 1969: 
57) who assumes intellectual equality with Charles (Fowles 1969: 140) and, for 
this reason, she is outside the strict parameters established by fierce Victorianism. 
However, the character of Sarah always remains aloof, perhaps positioned beyond 
anything that language can define, at all times displaying a behaviour which 
becomes incomprehensible to Charles, to the reader, to the narrator, to the author 
himself. Let us take the following extract as an instance of the above. Sarah and 
Charles have met in the Underwood; they suddenly feel the menace of being 
discovered: 
Charles felt pierced with a new embarrassment: he glanced at Sarah to see 
if she knew who the intruders were. But she stared at the hart’s-tongue 
ferns at her feet, as if they were merely sheltering from some shower of 
rain. Two minutes, then three passed. Embarrassment gave way to a 
degree of relief –it was clear that the two servants were far more 
interested in exploring each other than their surroundings. He glanced 
again at Sarah. Now she too was watching, from round her tree-trunk. She 
turned back, her eyes cast down. But then without warning she looked up 
at him. 
A moment. 
The she did something as strange, as shocking, as if she had thrown off 
her clothes. 
She smiled (Fowles 1969: 180). 
 
The above extract shows some ingredients which conform the character of Sarah: 
for a start, her elusiveness, Charles looks at her but she is looking elsewhere, in a 
 dynamics that repeats itself in each of their encounters. Her face is always half-
hidden, her regard is somewhere else, her personality cannot be, therefore, 
completely dilucidated. Secondly, her autonomy in relation to her own context. 
Whilst Charles is honestly ashamed and worried about what might happen if he is 
discovered in this situation, Sarah does not seem to allow shame or guilt. Finally, 
her connections with desire, her ambiguity. Sarah casts down her eyes but, 
suddenly, she looks up at Charles. Her smile speaks volumes and tells us that all 
this is really a funny game for her. The simile that the narrator uses is interesting, 
to say the least: Sarah’s smile is as scandalous as if she had taken all her clothes 
off. Her smile, therefore, is a sexual smile not in the sense of an invitation to 
copulation, but in the sense of sexual liberation in an age which represses female 
(and, hence, male) sexuality. Some pages later, when Charles holds Sarah and is 
about to kiss her, the narrator points consciously to this same idea: 
[Charles] slowly reached out his hands and raised her. Their eyes 
remained on each other’s, as if they were both hypnotized. She seemed to 
him –or those wide, those drowning eyes seemed- the most ravishingly 
beautiful he had ever seen. What lay behind them did not matter. The 
moment overcame the age (Fowles 1969: 243). 
 
What lies beneath Sarah’s eyes –her identity?- does not matter. She is a character 
far more advanced than the age, because she is an autonomous woman who 
decides upon her own identity, the Other who desires to transform into a subject. 
The writings of scientist Charles Darwin also outstripped his own age and that 
was the reason why both the writings and their author became the object of fierce 
criticism (the caricature of Darwin with the body of a monkey might come to 
mind here). However, On the Origin of Species (1859) is a text which constantly 
appears in John Fowles’s novel, maybe becoming a clue which we should take 
into account in order to cast light upon Sarah’s behaviour. As noted before, this is 
 what Tony E. Jackson proposes in his article “Charles and the Hopeful Monster” 
(1997). 
 Jackson argues that we need to recover the most modern aspects of 
Darwin in order to understand John Fowles’s use of the Origin, since 
understanding the theory of evolution means understanding ourselves as live 
beings. In The French Lieutenant’s Woman, the meeting between Charles and 
Sarah allows Charles to go through a kind of mental evolution –the change from 
the notion of Victorian subject to that of the modern subject. This is an evolution 
which is produced due to the effects of manipulation to which Sarah submits 
Charles (Jackson 1997: 226). But what does this tell us about Sarah herself? 
 Throughout the novel, Sarah is presented as a kind of superior being with 
a more solid self-consciousness, who teaches Charles in the knowledge of 
Existentialism, a doctrine she is already proficient in (Jackson 1997: 227). Fowles 
and his conscious narrator, however, deny all access to the character’s 
psychology. There is a possibility that this may be due to the fact that the 
linguistic parameters of the 19
th
 century do not allow a definition of what Sarah 
is. According to Jackson, Sarah can be described as “the hopeful monster of 
change”; i.e. a completely new specimen in the evolution of the species, one for 
whom there is no definition as yet. Within Darwinism, we may only understand 
newness in retrospective; that is, we are unable to narrate what is happening while 
it is happening, we can only name it once it has happened. Only in retrospective 
will we be able to understand it (Jackson 1997: 227). In the words of Darwin: 
It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, 
throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that 
which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and 
insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the 
improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic 
conditions of life. We see nothing of these slow changes in progress, until 
the hand of time has marked the long lapse of ages… (Darwin 1985: 125). 
 
 Just as newness in the evolution of the species can only be described in 
the future, the monster itself (the new being) does not know what it is, because it 
also needs to define itself via temporality. It lacks the experience of the passage 
from old to new, therefore it is unaware that it is a new being. This would explain 
why Sarah is elusive not only for Charles but also for the narrator, the author, and 
the reader. The descriptions of this character always follow ambiguous paths: “as 
if”, “seems”, “almost”... Sarah is Charles’s desire but, as a new being, as a 
monster, she also has her own desire which alienates her and forces her to 
describe herself through the vocabulary of desire: “nothing”, “hardly human”, 
“Do not ask me to explain what I have done. I cannot explain it. It is not to be 
explained”, “I am not to be understood even by myself”. Sarah cannot be 
described because she is ahistorical. In other words, there does not exist, as yet, 
the vocabulary which will allow us to categorize Sarah’s condition. Like 
Heathcliff, she is a character avant la lèttre. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS: HISTORICAL SUBJECTS 
Narrative dynamics positions the characters of Heathcliff and Sarah 
Woodruff as elusive and undefinable in a clear link with desire (“what cannot be 
said”). We have also seen that in their narrative position as the Other, as 
inhabitants of the dark area which the text’s progression allows, both are 
transformed as characters for the rest of the characters, who project onto them 
their desires, wishes, and fears. Nonetheless, the placement of these two figures 
within the space of otherness would unauthorize the possibility that they also felt 
desire. This seems to be the case. As the two texts advance, Heathcliff and Sarah 
prove that they are objects who strive to transform into subjects. Charles 
 Darwin’s theory of evolution has provided a clue to understand why this is the 
case. 
Both Heathcliff and Sarah appear on scene as mutations, as hopeful 
monsters, to follow Jackson’s terminology, as new beings in the evolution of the 
species and, as such, as objects of fear and rejection simply because of their 
incapacity to be catalogued. Neither one nor the other fits into any of the roles of 
the age: Heathcliff is and is not a gift of God and a demon, a prince in disguise 
kidnapped by wicked soldiers, the owner of two houses, a usurper, a hero, a 
villain,  a ghost; Sarah is and is not a Victorian governess, a fallen woman, a lost 
woman, a reject of society, a prostitute. Darwin tells us that “In social animals 
[natural selection] will adapt the structure of each individual for the benefit of the 
community: if each in consequence profits by the selected change” (Darwin 
1985: 129, italics added). 
As new entities, their identities cannot be constructed through 
specularization and/or identification, since there exists neither mirror nor 
identification object for them. The newer they are, the more alienated, the more 
abject, the more monstrous. Every step they take in narrative is another step 
towards their construction as unique creatures: the bourgeois and the new woman 
of the twentieth century. The problem is that both they and those around them and 
the narrative lack the vocabulary to define them. Thus, both are relegated to that 
space beyond language, to the zone for what culture excludes, to the realm of 
desire: “what is not said, what cannot be said”. 
 I would like to finish with a quote from On the Origin of Species which 
will allow me to provide a note on a future line of debate. What is the effect that 
the hopeful monster of change has on the rest of the species? Darwin has the 
answer:  
 … as new species in the course of time are formed through natural 
selection, others will become rarer and rarer and finally extinct. The forms 
which stand in closest competition with those undergoing modification and 
improvement, will naturally suffer most. [...]Consequently, each new 
variety or species, during the progress of its formation, will generally press 
hardest on its nearest kindred, and tend to exterminate them (Darwin 1985: 
159). 
 
The monster has repercussions on its environment. As new species are 
formed through natural selection, the rest become increasingly strange until they 
are finally extinguished. But those forms which are in direct competition with 
those improved ones are the ones which will suffer more. Inevitably, all those 
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